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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1888 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  YOUNES KABBAJ, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
(Related to D. Del. Civ. Nos. 10-cv-00431, 12-cv-01322, 13-cv-01522, 14-cv-00780,  
14-cv-00982, and 14-cv-01001) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
May 14, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed:  June 18, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Younes Kabbaj has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition.  He 
seeks to have us order Judge Richard G. Andrews and Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge 
to recuse themselves from any involvement in Kabbaj’s numerous cases, and to have us 
order the District Court to vacate a consent order entered April 24, 2012, in Civil Case 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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No. 10-cv-00431 in the District of Delaware (“Consent Order”), Docket number 54.1  
Because mandamus is a drastic remedy that is granted in only extraordinary cases, In re 
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005), and this is not such a 
case, we will deny the petition. 
I. 
 A mandamus petition is a proper means of challenging a district judge’s refusal to 
recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.  See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 778 (3d 
Cir. 1992).2  We review a decision not to recuse for abuse of discretion.  See In re 
Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 300-01 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2004).  In order to warrant 
recusal, the movant must establish that the judge would appear to be biased to “a 
reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts.”  United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 
194, 213 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Kabbaj contends that Judge Andrews and Magistrate Judge Thynge are biased 
against him.  In support of his claim that they should recuse, Kabbaj cites several reasons:  
(1) legal rulings against him by both judges evidence bias, (2) both judges are beholden 
to the “Homosexual lobby” and “Homosexual religion,” (3) Judge Andrews’ holdings in 
                                              
1 Although Kabbaj has filed a number of cases in the District Court, any docket numbers 
in this opinion refer to the numbers assigned in D. Del. Civ. No. 10-cv-00431. 
 
2 Kabbaj also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144.  Since, as a general rule, mandamus 
will not lie to review the denial of a motion filed under § 144, see In re Sch. Asbestos 
Litig., 977 F.2d at 774-76, we will consider only whether refusal to recuse under § 455 
was proper here. 
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Viacom, Inc., and his former law clerk’s current employment both have the appearance of 
impropriety, and (4) Judge Andrews’ characterization of some of Kabbaj’s statements as 
threats aimed at the judge evidence bias against Kabbaj.  We hold that Judges Andrews 
and Thynge did not abuse their discretion by determining that no reasonable person 
would view them as biased against Kabbaj. 
 First, “[w]e have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings 
does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”  See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. 
Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Second, a recusal motion must be 
based on “objective facts,” not mere “possibilities” and “unsubstantiated allegations.”   
United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1989).  Kabbaj’s allegations are not 
such that a reasonable person would believe that the judges are biased in favor of 
homosexual litigants or attorneys.3 
 Third, Kabbaj’s allegation that Judge Andrews’ holdings in Viacom, Inc. present 
an appearance of impropriety is completely baseless, as Viacom is not a party to any of 
Kabbaj’s suits at issue here.  Similarly, his allegation that Judge Andrews’ former law 
clerk was given a job at a law firm as a quid pro quo for her work on Kabbaj’s case is 
                                              
3 For example, he alleges, in part, that this bias is evidenced by Magistrate Judge 
Thynge’s display of a “gay pride flag” in her chambers.  In her opinion denying the 
motion for recusal, Judge Thynge explained that she does not display a gay pride flag in 
chambers, but that she does have a colorful afghan made by her aunt.  Dkt. #81 at 7.  
Kabbaj also claims that because U.S. Senator Chris Coons (who he claims recommended 
Judge Andrews’ appointment) delivered a sermon at a same-sex union and was expected 
to speak at the 17th Annual Delaware Pride Festival, Judge Andrews must be a member 
of the “Homosexual lobby.”  His attenuated allegations do not support a claim of bias. 
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baseless—Judge Andrews noted in his opinion denying the recusal motion that his former 
clerk did not work on Kabbaj’s cases and that in any event, the law firm that hired her 
had no connection with Kabbaj’s cases.  Dkt. #77 at 7-8. 
 Finally, Kabbaj claims that Judge Andrews falsely accused him of threatening the 
judge, and that Judge Andrews had the U.S. Marshals investigate him.  Kabbaj alleges 
that Judge Andrews thus could not be unbiased in his dealings with him.  Judge Andrews 
explains that he mentioned in an opinion that Kabbaj had made “threats of violence,” but 
that he did not state that Kabbaj had made threats against him.  But even if Judge 
Andrews had perceived that Kabbaj had made a threat against him, it would not require 
automatic recusal.  See United States v. Spangle, 626 F.3d 488, 496 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(recusal warranted if reasonable third-party observer would perceive significant risk that 
judge will be influenced by threat).  We conclude that Judges Andrews and Thynge did 
not abuse their discretion in denying Kabbaj’s motions for recusal. 
II. 
 Kabbaj also seeks to have us order the District Court to vacate the Consent Order, 
or to have us order the District Court to refrain from attempting to enforce the Consent 
Order.  To demonstrate that mandamus is appropriate, a petitioner must establish that he 
or she has “no other adequate means” to obtain the relief requested, and that he or she has 
a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ.  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 
79 (3d Cir. 1996).  Kabbaj had the opportunity to challenge the Consent Order by filing a 
proper and timely notice of appeal from the District Court’s entry of a final order.  As a 
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result, Kabbaj cannot make the required showing that he has no other adequate means to 
attain the desired relief.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Kabbaj’s petition. 
